When a reporter asked the FBI's New Haven office about a police seminar featuring two CAIR officials, the office pointed to a flyer naming the Muslim Coalition of Connecticut as the sponsor. A spokesman told the Investigative Project on Terrorism in 2011 that the bureau had chosen neither the speakers nor the topics, but reporters had already obtained its emails under the Freedom of Information Act. Those records showed that an FBI supervisor had edited the announcement to remove the office's role in organizing the event, making the flyer a convenient way to downplay work its own agents had done.
In February 2010, an FBI liaison agent had met representatives of the coalition at a mosque in Berlin, Connecticut, to plan a class for bureau employees on visiting mosques and speaking with worshippers. The proposed sessions covered practical matters such as how to address people in a mosque and pronounce common Muslim terms, with the agent expecting to host the class at the New Haven field office. That plan ran into trouble when the coalition proposed two instructors who held positions with CAIR's Connecticut chapter, prompting the agent to tell organizers in April that they could not take part. Faced with losing those speakers, the organizers said they would have to decide whether the training was worth holding at all.
In a May email to a local Muslim leader, the agent praised CAIR Connecticut's response to the attempted Times Square bombing and shared his frustration that the training had stalled. His disappointment could not change a directive from headquarters, where evidence from the Holy Land Foundation prosecution had led the FBI two years earlier to restrict outreach to CAIR nationwide. Agents could still investigate threats reported by a chapter, but inviting its officers to train FBI employees would give CAIR an institutional endorsement. The bureau was unwilling to offer that endorsement while questions about the national leadership's relationship with Hamas remained unresolved.
The document CAIR's rebuttal leaves out
In Dallas, a jury convicted the Holy Land Foundation and five of its leaders in November 2008 after prosecutors traced approximately $12.4 million in support to Hamas through charitable committees and societies. Jurors heard a recording of the charity's president, Shukri Abu Baker, discussing how to play down its Hamas ties so it could keep raising money in America. CAIR was not charged in the case, but its appearance in the evidence came from records reaching back more than a decade before the prosecution.
On July 30, 1994, just weeks after CAIR opened its Washington office, the Palestine Committee drew up an agenda to review the work and finances of several organizations. It listed the Holy Land Foundation and the Islamic Association for Palestine, where CAIR founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad had worked, with CAIR appearing beneath the word "Coordination". In its public rebuttal, CAIR devotes several paragraphs to a different document, a 1991 Muslim Brotherhood memorandum, and correctly points out that it did not exist at that time. That answer leaves the July 1994 agenda unaddressed, although the later record itself identifies neither a payment to CAIR nor anyone attending on its behalf. Its founders could explain whether anyone asked them to report back to the committee and what answer they gave.
Who organized the Connecticut seminar
The class eventually went ahead at the state police training academy in Meriden on October 29, 2010, with both CAIR speakers on the program and an FBI liaison agent helping shape what the room would hear. In his account afterward, the agent said he had helped develop the syllabus and had personally selected one of the six instructors, while a training officer told headquarters that the FBI and the Muslim Coalition had hosted the event together. When the Justice Department's inspector general reviewed those records in 2013, it found that the New Haven office's conduct was inconsistent with bureau policy. The spokesman's assurance that the FBI had chosen no speakers was difficult to reconcile with the account its own agent had put on file.
CAIR says the outreach restriction had "no practical impact" because agents continued to work with its chapters on investigations, and the Connecticut seminar shows that its officers still managed to teach a class attended by law enforcement. What the organization could no longer rely on was an FBI field office willing to acknowledge publicly that it had helped bring them into the room. The office pointed reporters toward somebody else's name on the flyer while telling headquarters that it had hosted the event with the coalition, leaving two very different accounts of the same event.
Sources behind this article
- Field office's statement to reporters Source linked in the submitted article
- The agent's February and April memoranda, pp. 1–4 Source linked in the submitted article
- Agent's May email, p. 7 Source linked in the submitted article
- FBI's explanation to Congress Source linked in the submitted article
- Justice Department account of the verdict and wiretap Source linked in the submitted article
- July 1994 agenda, English translation Source linked in the submitted article
- CAIR's account of the restriction Source linked in the submitted article
- Inspector General's findings, pp. 19–22 Source linked in the submitted article
- Inspector General's account of the conflicting records Source linked in the submitted article
